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I. INTRODUCTION
The Anti-Injunction Act' generally prohibits a federal court from
enjoining proceedings in state courts.2 An exception to the Act,
known as the relitigation exception, allows a federal court to issue an
injunction to "protect or effectuate its judgments."3 The exception is
based on concerns about claim preclusion and collateral estoppel.4
Several courts of appeals have recently interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.5 to require a nar-
row interpretation of the relitigation exception.6 They have held that
the exception does not allow a federal court to protect the full claim
preclusion effect of its judgment.7 Ordinarily, the doctrine of claim
preclusion can operate to bar claims that were actually litigated in a
prior proceeding and claims that could have been but were not
brought in that proceeding.8 Despite this, several appellate courts
have decided that the relitigation exception only allows them to enjoin
claims which have actually been litigated or decided by the federal
courts.9 Thus, they have concluded that federal courts cannot enjoin
claims that are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, but which
were not actually litigated. 0 Only the Ninth Circuit has rejected the
"actually litigated" test and held that federal courts can protect the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
2. I& The Act provides that:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
3. Id-
4. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988)(the relitigation excep-
tion "is founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral
estoppel").
5. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
6. See American Town Center v. Hall 83 Assoc., 912 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer
v. Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc., 878 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1989); Texas Employer's Ins.
Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1988).
7. American Town Center v. Hall 83 Assoc., 912 F.2d 104, 112 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer
v. Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc., 878 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1989); Texas Employer's
Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (under the doc-
trine of res judicata, "[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies form relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in the action"); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)("In [an
action upon the same claim], the judgment if rendered upon the merits, consti-
tutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or
demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose").
9. See supra note 6.
10. See supra note 6.
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full claim preclusion effect of their judgments." In Parsons Steel v.
First Alabama Bank,12 the Supreme Court expressly left this question
open.
The currently prevailing interpretation constitutes the latest at-
tack on the relitigation exception. The first attack took place in 1941,
when the Supreme Court eliminated the exception in Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co.13 Congress, however, restored the exception in
1948.14 The new attack on the relitigation exception poses a number
of significant problems in that the interpretation is not only contrary
to Congressional intent, but also threatens to undermine the power of
the federal courts. The interpretation risks displacing the federal
courts from their role as the primary protectors of federal rights. It
also threatens to undermine the integrity of federal judgments and
the policies animating the federal law of res judicata. To correct this
situation and resolve the conflict in the circuit courts, this article ar-
gues that the prevailing interpretation of the Act is mistaken and a
federal court should be able to protect the full claim preclusion effect
of its judgments by enjoining claims that were not actually litigated.
Section II of this article offers a brief history of the Anti-Injunction
Act and the relitigation exception, while exploring the extent to
which the federal courts have enjoined state court proceedings to en-
force their judgments following the 1948 revision of the Act. In addi-
tion, it describes how most courts have read Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon
Corp.,15 to mean that federal courts cannot protect the full claim pre-
clusion effect of their judgments and concludes that those courts have
mistakenly interpreted that decision. Finally, Section III provides a
comprehensive rationale for interpreting the Act which would allow
federal courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their
judgments.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELITIGATION EXCEPTION
A. Origins of the Act and the Relitigation Exception
For almost two hundred years, this country has had some form of
Anti-Injunction Act. In 1793, Congress enacted the original version of
the Anti-Injunction Act. The law provided that no "writ of injunction
be granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a
11. See Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. 474 U.S. 518, 526 (1986)(leaving open the question whether the relitigation excep-
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act was "intended by Congress to allow the issuance
of a federal court injunction in situations where the later state action involves
claims that could have been litigated but where not actually litigated in the prior
federal action").
13. 314 U.S. 118, 139-41 (1941).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
15. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
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state... "16 On its face, the law seemed to absolutely forbid federal
courts from enjoining state proceedings. The courts, however, refused
to strictly enforce the statute and recognized a number of exceptions
to the statute.17
Early on, the courts acknowledged that Congress had created cer-
tain express or implied statutory exceptions to the Act.' 8 Thus, courts
could enjoin state court proceedings in certain cases dealing with (1)
bankruptcy proceedings,19 (2) removal of actions to federal court,20 (3)
limitations of shipowner liability,2 ' (4) interpleader 22, and (5) the Fra-
zier-Lemke Act.23
Beyond these statutory exceptions, the courts created three catego-
ries of judicial exceptions to the Act. One of these was known as the
"in rem" exception. This exception covered cases in which both a fed-
eral court and a state court sought to adjudicate rights to property al-
ready in the custody of the federal courts. In such cases, the federal
courts had power to enjoin state court proceedings.24 In addition, fed-
eral courts created an exception to cover fraudulent judgment cases.,
This exception allowed federal courts to enjoin individuals from en-
16. Act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat. 335.
17. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 11.2, at 556 (1989)("The
Supreme Court did not treat the prohibition against injunctions as an absolute
bar to such relief. Quite the contrary, the court recognized a number of situations
in which federal courts could stay state proceedings").
18. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47, at 279 (1983) (noting
that the Supreme Court recognized that certain statutes "authorized injunctions
against state court proceedings and had to be regarded as implied statutory excep-
tions to the anti-injunction statute"); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 310 (1990)("One exception [to
the Anti-Injunction Act] existed for cases arising under statutes which directly or
indirectly authorized the stay of state proceedings").
19. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-33 (1941).
20. French v. Hay, 22 U.S. (1 Wall) 250, 253 n.22 (1874).
21. Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 599 (1883).
22. Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937).
23. Kalb v. Feurstein, 308 U.S. 433, 436 (1940). Agricultural Debt Relief (Frazier-
Lemke) Act, 11 U.S.C. § 203(s), repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
Tit. IV, § 401(f), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2682. The Frazier-Lemke Act dealt
with bankruptcy proceedings against farm property. See id.
24. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 18, at 310-311 ("Under the so-called "res" exception,
a federal court could enjoin a subsequent state court proceeding that might inter-
fere with the federal court's jurisdiction over a res"). Kline v. Burke Construc-
tion Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922)("The rule and authority of the [federal and state]
courts are equal, but both courts cannot possess or control the same thing at the
same time, and any attempt to do so would result in unseemly conflict"); Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co, 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941)("The role has become well
settled, therefore, that the [Anti-Injunction Act] does not preclude the use of the
injunction by a federal court to restrain state proceedings seeking to interfere
with property in the custody of the court").
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forcing judgments fraudulently obtained in the state courts.25
Finally, the courts developed what became known as the relitiga-
tion exception. This exception allowed a federal court to enjoin reliti-
gation in a state court of matters already adjudicated by the federal
court in order to protect its judgments -or decrees.26 This exception
was so well established that by 1905, one leading treatise expressly
stated that: "[A] federal court may grant an injunction against a pro-
ceeding in a state court when necessary to render effective its own
decree."27
B. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.: The Demise of the Relitigation
Exception
In Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,28 the Supreme Court
rethought its approach to the Anti-Injunction Act and the relitigation
exception. Toucey sued the New York Life Insurance Company in eq-
uity in a Missouri state court for payment of benefits and restoration
of his policy on the ground that the company had fraudulently con-
cealed disability provisions from him. The case was removed to fed-
eral court in Missouri. The federal court dismissed the case, finding
that although the company had committed fraud, Toucey was not
disabled.
SubsequentlyToucey assigned the policy to a person named Shay
who brought an action at law against the company in Missouri state
court. Shay alleged that Toucey's disability entitled him to a judg-
ment. The defendant insurance company filed a "supplemental bill"
in federal court seeking an injunction against state court proceedings
to prevent Shay from readjudicating issues that had already been set-
tled by the federal decree.
The court issued a preliminary injunction since the issue of
Toucey's disability, which also formed the basis of Shay's suit, had al-
ready been resolved in the company's favor. The lower court held that
federal courts have power to enjoin state court proceedings where an
injunction is "necessary to preserve to litigants the fruits of, or to ef-
25. See, e.g., Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S.
115 (1915).
26. See, e.g., CHEmEruNSKy, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 556-557 ("Nor did the Act prevent
a federal court from enjoining state proceedings that threatened to undermine a
previous federal judgment or harass successful litigants in federal court proceed-
ings"). See also Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904)(federal court could
protect its decrees by enjoining state court proceedings). Riverdale Cotton Mills
v. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188 (1905)(same).
27. 2 POMERoy's EQUITABLE REMEDIES 1079 (1905). See also REDISH, supra note 18, at
311 ("Prior to the decision in Toucey, it had been thought by many that a federal
court could enjoin a state proceeding that threatened to litigate an issue already
decided by the federal court").
28. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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fectuate the lawful decrees of the federal courts."29
The Supreme Court reversed.30 The Court conceded that certain
judicial exceptions had developed despite the unqualified language of
the Act. Nevertheless, the Court eliminated the relitigation exception
and held that the Act prohibits a federal court from enjoining state
court proceedings on the ground that a claim had been previously ad-
judicated by the federal court. The Court recognized only two excep-
tions to the Anti-Injunction Act: (1) statutory exceptions and (2) the
"in rem" exception.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Reed challenged the major-
ity's conclusion. Reed analyzed the early relitigation cases and deter-
mined that they stood for the principle "that a court has the right to
execute its decrees to avoid relitigation and forced reliance on res judi-
cata."3 ' He observed that "it may be accurately stated that for more
than half a century there has been a widely accepted rule supporting
the power of the federal courts to prevent relitigation."32 In the wake
of Toucey, the federal courts acknowledged that the relitigation excep-
tion was dead.3 3
C. The 1948 Revision of the Act: The Revival of the Relitigation
Exception
In 1948, Congress responded to the Toucey decision. Persuaded by
the dissenting opinion of Justice Reed, Congress amended the Act so
as to adopt the present form of the statute and allow a federal court to
issue an injunction to protect and effectuate judgments.34 The Re-
viser's Note to the 1948 revision states that Congress intended to over-
rule Toucey and restore the pre-Toucey law regarding the power of
the federal courts to protect and effectuate their judgments.3 5
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id. at 152-53. Reed reasoned that absent such an exception to the Act:
a federal judgment entered perhaps after years of expense in money and
energy and after the production of thousands of pages of evidence comes
to nothing that is final. It is to be only the basis for a plea of res judicata
which is to be examined by another court, unfamiliar with the record
already made, to determine whether the issues were or were not settled
by the former adjudication.
Id. at 144.
33. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 152 F.2d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). "A court of the United States may not grant an injunc-
tion to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." (emphasis added).
35. The Reviser's Notes, H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., ft. A., at 181 (1947)
reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1910, 1910. The Reviser's Note states in relevant
part:
[Vol. 72:643
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Thus, as one distinguished commentator explained shortly after
the 1948 revision, the third exception regarding the protection or ef-
fectuation of judgments:
[o]verrules the holding of the Toucey case and adopts the theory of the 'reliti-
gation' cases, which Toucey had rejected. In other words where a federal
court has adjudicated a matter, [the] court can protect or effectuate its judg-
ment, whether in personam or in rem, by enjoining, at the instance of the
prevailing party, relitigation of the matter.3 6
D. Post-Toucey: Protecting Judgments by Enjoining Claims That Have
Not Actually Been Litigated
Having set forth the general history of the Act and the relitigation
exception, this section discusses the extent to which federal courts
protected the claim preclusion effect of their judgments in the years
following the 1948 revision to the Act, but prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.37 In Section III.B.
of this article, this history will form the basis of an argument that
Congress, in the face of the almost uniform view that the federal
courts have the power to protect the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments, has approved this interpretation of the Act through
its silence.
In the years following the 1948 Revision, the federal courts clearly
recognized that they could protect the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments by enjoining claims that had not actually been liti-
gated. Three examples will suffice. The earliest case was Lee v. Ter-
minal Transport Co.38 The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal district
court and obtained a judgment against the defendant. The plaintiffs
then asked the district court to amend the judgment to provide for
interest. However, they withdrew their motion before the court could
consider their request. The plaintiffs then brought another lawsuit in
state court against the defendant in order to collect interest on the
judgment. In response, the district court enjoined the state court ac-
The exceptions specifically include the words 'to protect or effectuate its
judgments,' for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal
courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies
fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New York Life. Co., 314
U.S. 118, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100). A vigorous dissenting opinion (62
S.Ct. 148) notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of the judicial code,
the power of the courts of the United States to protect their judgments
was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change and
Congress intended no change).
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally un-
derstood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.
36. WILLIAM J. MOORE, COMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 410-11 (1949).
37. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
38. 282 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1960).
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tion.39 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the injunction.40 Emphasizing
that the district court's judgment "terminated the case between plain-
tiffs and defendant,"41 the court reasoned that
an injunction was necessary to protect that judgment because otherwise the
interest question which was incidental to the case litigated by plaintiffs in the
federal courts would have been carved out of the federal court judgment by
plaintiffs and submitted to the Illinois state court.
Thus, in Lee, the district court protected the full claim preclusion ef-
fect of its decree by enjoining plaintiff's claim for interest-a claim
that could have been but which had not actually been litigated in fed-
eral court.42
The Fifth Circuit also protected the full claim preclusion effect of
its judgment in the leading case of Woods Exploration & Production
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America.43 In Woods, the plaintiffs filed state
law claims arising out of the production of natural gas from a certain
field in a state court.44 Later, the plaintiffs filed a federal antitrust
action in federal court against the same defendants but did not assert
any state law claims.45 The federal court rendered judgment for the
defendants and enjoined the plaintiffs from further prosecution of the
suit in state court.46
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction.47 The court explained
that the relitigation exception to the Act "means simply that a federal
court may enjoin a state proceeding which is precluded under the doc-
trine of res judicata."48 The Fifth Circuit held that the "district court
decision was res judicata of the state proceeding and thus justified the
39. Id. at 806.
40. Id. at 807.
41. Id.
42. Id The court also stated that "a failure to assert a right in a federal court when a
case involving that right is adjudicated does not justify a litigant's assertion of
that right in a state court." Id.
43. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. Id. at 1289. The state court suit sought damages for: (1) state antitrust violations;
(2) misrepresentation; (3) tortious interference with contract or advantageous
business relationship and; (4) violation of Texas commerce purchaser's statute.
Id.
45. Id. The lawsuits in both the state and federal court were based on the same acts
of the defendants. Id.
46. Id. at 1292.
47. Id at 1315-16.
48. Id. at 1312 (emphasis in original). The court observed:
As one commentator has noted, this is a sensible solution to the problem
of relitigation of federal decisions. It prevents multiple litigation of the
same cause of action and it assures the winner in a federal court that he
will not be deprived of the fruits of his victory by a later contrary state
judgment which the Supreme Court may or may not decide to review.
Id. (quoting Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 726, 734 (1961)).
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issuance of an injunction." 49 As a result, in Woods, the district court
protected the full claim preclusion effect of its judgment by enjoining
the state law claims---claims that had not actually been litigated in the
federal action.
The decision in Chrysler Corp. v. E.L. Jones Dodge,50 provides an-
other example of a court protecting the full claim preclusion effect of
its judgment. In Chrysler, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident.
He filed an action in federal court for personal injuries against
Chrysler, the manufacturer of the car. After a trial, the jury returned
a special verdict finding that the car was not defective "when it was
sold by Chrysler Corporation."51
The plaintiff then brought a state court action against Jones, the
retailer of the car. Jones joined Chrysler as an additional defendant.
Chrysler sought to enjoin the state action on the ground that it was an
attempt to litigate issues that had earlier been adjudicated by the fed-
eral court.52 Finding that res judicata barred the state proceeding, the
federal court enjoined the proceeding despite the fact that the state
action involved negligence and breach of warranty claims which had
not actually been litigated. "Refusal to afford federal injunctive relief
in this situation would only be a cause for alarm that the battle was to
be fought over again. We do not think the halls of justice should be
used for this purpose."5 3
49. 438 F.2d 1286, 1312 (5th Cir. 1971).
50. 421 F.Supp. 969 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
51. Id. at 970.
52. Id. at 972. In response, Jones argued that the federal court had actually decided
only one issue-that the car was not defective at the time it came into the hands
of the plaintiff. Jones argued that "no jury has answered the question of whether
the car at anytime between the dates of its delivery to [the plaintiff] and the acci-
dent... became defective... and, if it did, whether any of the named defendants
are legally responsible . . ." Id at 971. Plaintiffs also asserted a number of claims
that had not been raised in federal court including negligence and breach of war-
ranty. Id.
53. Id. The Second Circuit considered the issue in Browning Debenture Holders'
Comm. v. Dasa Corp., 605 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs brought an action in
federal court which arose out of a proposal by defendant to reduce the conversion
price of certain of its debentures. The district court dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiffs then brought an action in a New York state court alleging the same
claims that had been brought in federal court. In addition, plaintiffs alleged a
new claim-a state law claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants sought
and obtained an order from the federal district court enjoining the state court
proceeding. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. Dasa Corp., 454 F. Supp. 88,
100 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
The Second Circuit ruled that the district court had correctly enjoined the
litigation of the state law claims since they were barred by res judicata. 605 F.2d
35, 38 (1978). The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that an injunc-
tion could not issue because the district court did not consider their claims based
upon the applicable state law of fiduciary duty. The court explained: "res judi-
cata is binding upon parties as to issues which might have been raised but were
652 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:643
In the years following the 1948 revision to the Act, there appears to
not." Id. at 39. "Thus, even if the district court had not ruled explicitly on the
state law fiduciary claims now sought to be raised in the state courts, litigation of
such claims nevertheless would be barred by res judicata." 1d.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the district court had
abused its discretion in granting the injunction because defendants could obtain
sufficient relief by asserting res judicata as a defense in state court. The court
reasoned:
In a case such as this it would be a disservice not only to the defendants
but also to the state judiciary to allow the entire record to be placed in
the lap of the New York State courts to be argued over by lawyers and
puzzled over by judges for years to come. While comity requires respect
for the ability of the state courts to decide the issue of res judicata prop-
erly, it also requires sympathy for their calendar problems and for the
task that would confront them were this litigation to be imposed upon
them.
Id. at 40.
In Harper Plastics v. Amoco Chemical Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981), the
Seventh Circuit again held that federal courts have power to protect the full
claim preclusion effect of their judgments. In Harper, plaintiffs filed a federal
antitrust lawsuit in the district court. Plaintiffs lost on summary judgment.
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in an Illinois state court, based on the same
conduct of the defendant as that alleged in the federal complaint. The state court
complaint, however, asserted a new breach of contract claim. Defendants then
returned to the federal court and obtained an injunction against the state court
action. Id. at 942.
The question on appeal was whether an injunction could issue under the reliti-
gation exception of the Act when the federal court had never actually decided
whether defendant's conduct constituted a breach of contract. The Seventh Cir-
cuit explained that the "obvious import of [the relitigation exception] is that a
federal court may enjoin state proceedings when res judicata would bar the same
action in federal court." Id. at 947. Thus, although the breach of contract issue
was never actually litigated in federal court, the court could enjoin litigation of
the contract claim since it was barred by res judicata. The court reasoned:
While [the Anti-Injunction Act] may be grounded in principles of comity
and federalism.., those principles do not supercede [sic] the doctrine of
res judicata. The relitigation exception to [the Act] recognizes that
much. Nor may those principles be invoked as a makeshift excuse for
inadvertent pleading.
Id.
Similarly, federal courts protected the full claim preclusion effect of their
judgments in BGWAssoc., Inc. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 532 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.
N.Y. 1982), and In Re National Student Mktg. Litigation, 655 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C.
1987). In BGW, the court held that an injunction could issue to bar "any new
issues of defenses to enforcement of [a] contract" from being raised in a state
court proceeding because they are "barred by the doctrine of res judicata since
such defenses and claims might and should have been raised in this district
court's trial of the issues." 532 F.Supp. 115, 1117 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). In National
Student Marketing, the court protected the full res judicata effect of its judgment
to preserve "the full fruits and advantages" of the court's judgment. 655 F.Supp.
at 664.
Finally, in First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons Steel, 825 F.2d 1475
(llth Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit held that federal courts could protect the
full claim preclusion effect of their judgments. Plaintiffs had filed suit in Ala-
bama state court against First Alabama alleging that First Alabama fraudulently
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
be only one case where a court refused to issue an injunction to protect
the full claim preclusion effect of its judgment. In Delta Airlines, Inc.
v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc.,54 Delta sought to enjoin the defendant
from prosecuting a state court action challenging the legality of cer-
tain lease agreements involving the airlines and the local aviation au-
thority under Florida law. Previously, the federal court had ruled
against McCoy, holding that the lease agreements did not violate fed-
eral antitrust laws. The airlines argued that res judicata applied to bar
the state law claims and a federal injunction should be issued to pro-
tect the preclusive effect of the federal judgment. The district court
denied the injunction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that no prior
federal judgment needed protection.5 5 The court explained: "Under
the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act . . . a federal
court may enjoin a state proceeding only if necessary to protect or ef-
fectuate its own judgment."5 6 The court reasoned that a federal
court's judgment is "far more threatened if the state proceeding in-
volves the same issues than if it involves only issues that could have
been, but were not, raised."5 7 The court concluded that an injunction
was not warranted, explaining that "we fail to see how a state court
ruling that the airline agreements violate state constitutional law
could undermine the integrity of the federal court ruling that the
agreements do not violate federal antitrust law."58 Significantly,
although the court refused to enjoin the state court action, the court
appears to have conceded that the district courts had the power to en-
join state proceedings involving claims that could have been raised in
the federal court.59 The court emphasized, however, that merely hay-
forced plaintiff Parson to allow Michael Orange to take control of plaintiff Par-
sons-Montgomery company. Later, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against
First Alabama alleging that the same acts of First Alabama that gave rise to the
state law suit violated the federal Bank Holding Act.
The federal court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 1478.
Defendants then sought to enjoin further prosecution of the state action on the
basis of res judicata. The district court enjoined the state court action. Id at 1479.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the injunction holding that the claims raised in
the state court proceedings "should have been raised as pendent claims in the
[federal proceeding] and therefore were barred under res judicata principles." Id.
at 1485. The court further explained that "Precedent binding on this circuit
clearly holds that 'a federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding which is
precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.' " Id (quoting Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1312 (5th Cir. 1971)).
54. 708 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1983).
55. Id at 586-87.
56. Id at 586.
57. Id. at 586.
58. I&
59. Id- (stating that Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Company of
America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) "perhaps stands for the proposition that
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ing such power did not require federal courts to issue injunctions.60
The Delta Airlines decision is poorly reasoned. In particular, the
court's suggestion that the integrity of a federal court judgment would
not be undermined by a failure to protect its full claim preclusion ef-
fect cannot withstand scrutiny. As discussed in Section III.C. below,
allowing a claim to proceed that should have been barred by the doc-
trine of claim preclusion undermines the integrity of federal judg-
ments by destroying the res judicata rights that were established by
the judgment.61
In any event, the other post-1948 cases clearly demonstrate that for
at least 30 years the federal courts exercised the power to protect the
full claim preclusion effect of their judgments by enjoining claims that
have not actually been litigated. In addition, leading commentators of
the time also proclaimed that federal courts had this power.6 2
E. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. and Its Progeny
While for many years the federal courts recognized that they had
the power to enjoin state proceedings to protect the full claim preclu-
sion effect of their judgments, the Supreme Court's decision in Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,63 has called this rule into question.
1. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.
In Chick Kam Choo, Leong Chong, a resident of Singapore, was ac-
cidentally killed in Singapore while repairing a ship. His widow,
Chick Kam Choo, also a resident of Singapore, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Houston,
Texas. She alleged claims under: (1) the Jones Act, (2) the Death on
the High Seas Act, (3) general maritime law of the United States and
district courts may in some circumstances enjoin state proceedings involving
claims that could have been raised in the federal court").
60. 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1983).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 200-05.
62. For example, Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper summarized the law on this
point in 1988 as follows:
[T]here are many cases in which injunctions have been issued to prevent
relitigation of matters that have been finally decided by a federal court.
If the state action is an attempt to relitigate a claim that has been liti-
gated in federal court, claim preclusion-or res judicata, in the older ter-
minology-applies and the injunction may bar the state suit entirely.
Claim preclusion bars state litigation on a part of the claim that could
have been, but was not, heard in the federal action, and it bars suit in a
state court on a state law claim that, under the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction, could have been joined with a claim under federal law in the
federal action."
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226, at 541-
545 (1988).
63. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
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(4) the Texas wrongful death act. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the first three claims, and also moved for dismissal under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on
the Jones Act and Death on the High Seas claims. 64 The court also
dismissed the general maritime law claim on the ground that the law
of Singapore, not that of the United States, controlled.6 5 Finally, the
district court granted the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds.66
The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit in a Texas state court. She as-
serted the same claims in state court as she had in the federal court.
In addition, she alleged a new claim based on Singapore law. The
plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed the federal law claims. This left
the claims based on Texas and Singapore law. On motion of the de-
fendants, the district court enjoined the state court proceedings.6 7
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction under the relitigation excep-
tion to the Act in order to prevent relitigation of the forum non con-
veniens issue.6 8 The Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion despite the
fact that the Texas "open forum" law suggested that the forum non
conveniens doctrine was not applicable to the case. 69
On review, the Supreme Court held that the Act precluded the is-
suance of an injunction.7 0 The court observed that the purpose of the
Act is to forestall "the inevitable friction between the state and fed-
eral courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceed-
ings by a federal court."71 Addressing the exceptions to the Act, the
court recognized that they "are designed to insure the effectiveness
and supremacy of federal law."72 However, the Court explained that
"the exceptions are narrow and are 'not [to] be enlarged by loose statu-
tory construction.' "73
Turning to the relitigation exception, the Court observed that it
was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an
issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal
court. The court illustrated the exception with its decision in Atlantic
64. 1& at 143.
65. M
66. I&
67. I& at 144.
68. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1987).
69. 1& at 314. Arguably, the Texas "open forum" law guaranteed foreign plaintiffs
the right to bring personal injury actions in Texas without being subject to forum
non conveniens dismissal. See Alfaro v. Dow Chem., 751 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tex.
1988)(open forum law bars application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
personal injury actions brought by foreign plaintiffs).
70. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
71. Id at 146.
72. Ad
73. Id
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Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Locomotive Engineers.74 The court
explained:
Thus, as Atlantic Coast Line makes clear, an essential prerequisite for apply-
ing the relitigation exception is that the claims or issues which the federal
judgment insulates from litigation in state proceedings actually have been de-
cided by the federal court. Moreover, Atlantic Coast Line illustrates that this
prerequisite is strict and narrow.7 5
Applying these principles, the Court observed that the district
court did not resolve the merits of the Singapore claim. The only issue
that the district court actually decided was that the plaintiff's claims
should be dismissed under the federal forum non conveniens doctrine.
The Court reasoned that because the Texas courts "might not apply
the same, or indeed, any forum non conveniens analysis to the case,"
the district court did not actually decide whether the Texas courts
were an appropriate forum under Texas law for plaintiff's claims
under Singapore law.76 Thus, the district court could not enjoin the
state court and prevent consideration of whether Texas court were an
appropriate forum.
In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claim
under the Texas wrongful death act had actually been litigated in the
prior federal proceeding when the district court had ruled that Singa-
pore law governed the case.77 Thus, the district court could enjoin
plaintiff's Texas law claim under the relitigation exception to the Act.
2. Lower Court Interpretation of Chick Kam Choo: The New
Attack on the Relitigation Exception
In the years following Chick Kam Choo, several circuit courts have
interpreted that decision and concluded that the relitigation exception
only applies to claims or issues that have actually been litigated or
decided by the federal courts.78 Thus, three circuits have held that
federal courts have no power to enjoin claims that were not actually
litigated, but that are barred by claim preclusion.7 9 Only the Ninth
Circuit has rejected the "actually litigated" test and held that courts
can protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judgments.8 0 This
74. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
75. 486 U.S. 140, 148 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 145.
77. Id. at 150-51.
78. See In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1478 (1st Cir. 1991); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Burke, 897 F.2d 734, 737-38 (4th Cir. 1990); American Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Asso-
ciates, 912 F.2d 104, 112 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878
F.2d 638, 642-44 (2nd Cir. 1989); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d
491, 501 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. See American Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Assoc., 912 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer v.
Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc., 878 F.2d 638 (2d. Cir. 1989); Texas Employer's Ins.
Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1988).
80. Western Systems, Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992).
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section discusses the four cases which have considered the question
whether federal courts have the authority to protect the full claim
preclusion effect of their judgments.
a. Majority View Among the Circuits
The circuits that have held that federal courts have no power to
protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judgments have
reached their conclusion without carefully reasoned analysis. They
simply base their conclusion on the language in Chick Kam Choo
which states that "an essential prerequisite for applying the relitiga-
tion exception is that the claims or issues" which a party is seeking to
enjoin under the Act "actually have been decided by the federal
court."81 For example, in Texas Employer's Insurance Ass'n v. Jack-
son,82 plaintiff Jackson filed a claim for permanent disability under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA)
against his employer's insurer, the Texas Employer's Insurance Asso-
ciation (TEIA).83 An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Jack-
son disability benefits.
Jackson then sued TEIA in a Texas state court, alleging state law
claims of bad faith and emotional distress arising out of TEIA's earlier
suspension of Jackson's LHWCA compensation benefits. TEIA
sought and obtained an injunction against the state court proceeding.8 4
The Fifth Circuit reversed.8 5 In reaching its conclusion, the court
emphasized the language in Chick Kam Choo which states that "an
essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that the
claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation
in state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal
court."8 6 Applying this rule, the court rejected TEIA's argument that
the relitigation exception could be invoked because Jackson's state
law claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The court
noted that the claims for bad faith and emotional distress were not
resolved by the ALJ. Thus, the court had no power to enjoin the state
law claims.8 7
The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Staffer v. Bouchard
81. 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988).
82. 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1988).
83. Id at 494. Prior to the lawsuit, TEIA paid some benefits to Jackson, but later
suspended payments.
84. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 618 F. Supp. 1316, 1323-24 (E.D. Tex.
1985).
85. 862 F.2d 49, 500-01.
86. Id. at 500-01 (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148).
87. The court explained that "TEIA's argument ... appears to be inconsistent with
Chick Kam Choo's admonishment that the relitigation exception 'is strict and nar-
row' so that only 'claims or issues which actually... have been decided' in the
prior proceeding as reflected by what the prior 'order actually said' are protect-
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Transportation Co.88 Plaintiff Staffer filed a lawsuit in federal court
against Bouchard to recover for personal injuries. Bouchard filed a
third party complaint against Staten Island Hospital and a Doctor
Suarez, alleging that medical malpractice had aggravated Staffer's in-
juries. With respect to Staffer's claim against Bouchard, the jury re-
turned a judgment in favor of Staffer.89 The jury returned a verdict
against Suarez and in favor of the hospital in the third party action.90
Staffer then filed a malpractice action against the hospital and
Suarez in a New York state court. The hospital and Suarez sought to
enjoin the state court action under the relitigation exception on the
ground of res judicata. The district court denied the motion.91
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of an injunction. Quoting
Chick Kam Choo, the court explained that for the relitigation excep-
tion to be properly exercised, it is "an essential prerequisite ... that
the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litiga-
tion in state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal
court."92 Since Staffer did not assert his malpractice claims against
the hospital and Suarez in the federal proceeding, those claims could
not be enjoined-even if they were barred under the doctrine of claim
preclusion-because they were "not raised in or decided by the federal
court."93 Thus, the Second Circuit held that federal courts have no
power to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judgments.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit dealt with the question in American
Town Center v. Hall 83 Associates.94 Plaintiff American Town Center
Association (ATCA) filed a three count complaint against Hall seek-
ing specific performance of an agreement to sell real property.95 The
able [under the relitigation exception]." Id at 501 (quoting from Chick Kam
Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988)).
88. 878 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. Id. at 641.
90. Id,
91. Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 697 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
92. 878 F.2d 638, 642 (quoting Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988)).
93. The court explained that:
The language and facts of Chick Kam Choo make clear that the part of
the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that is based on con-
cerns of res judicata is more narrowly tailored than the doctrine of res
judicata. The relitigation exception does not protect the full res judicata
effect of a federal court's judgment; rather, it protects only matters that
actually have been decided by a federal court.... [U]ndoubtedly, res
judicata can bar claims that might and should have been raised but were
not, but, for Anti-Injunction Act purposes, only 'relitigation' can be
enjoined.
Id. at 643.
94. 912 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 107. The complaint alleged that: (1) Hall breached a written contract; (2)
Hall breached its oral contract; and (3) that Hall committed fraud and
misrepresentation.
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district court issued a judgment in favor of Hall on two of the claims.96
ATCA then filed a lawsuit arising out of the same transaction to
sell real property in a Michigan state court against several partner-
ships managed by Hall.97 Hall sought to enjoin the state court action
on the theory that ATCA was seeking to relitigate claims. The district
court refused to grant the injunction.98
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of an injunction.99 The court
explained that under Chick Kam Choo the relitigation exception ap-
plied only to claims that "actually have been decided by the federal
court."1 0 0 Finding that the bad faith and estoppel claims in the state
court action had not been litigated in the federal action, the court held
that the district court's "refusal to enjoin the Michigan proceeding was
proper."lOl
The decisions in Texas Employer's, Staffer and American Town
Center are not persuasive because they fail to employ the traditional
methods of statutory interpretation in construing the Act. Instead,
they blindly rely on ambiguous language in Chick Kam Choo to sup-
port the proposition that federal courts have no power to protect the
full claim preclusion effect of their judgments.
b. The Misinterpretation of Chick Kam Choo
Chick Kam hoo should not be read to mean that federal courts
can protect only some of the claim preclusion effect of their judg-
ments. To be sure, the Chick Kam Choo court said that "an essential
prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that the claims
or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation... ac-
tually have been decided."102 This language, however, is not disposi-
tive. To the extent that the reference to "claims" suggests that federal
courts can protect only some of the claim preclusion effect of their
judgments-claims that have actually been litigated-the language
must be regarded as unconsidered dicta.103
First, the Chick Kam Choo court did not directly address the ques-
tion of whether a federal court can enjoin claims that were not actu-
ally litigated but which are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
96. Id at 107.
97. Id ATCA alleged several claims that had not been raised in the federal action,
including claims based on the doctrines of promissory estoppel and the duty to act
in good faith. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of res
judicata. The state court denied the motion. Id.
98. Id. at 107-08.
99. Id at 111.
100. Id at 112 n.2 (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988)).
101. Id at 112 n.2.
102. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988)(emphasis added).
103. See Western Sys. Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1992); 17 WRIGHT, ET AL.,
supra note 62, § 4226, at 85 n.12.1 (the Chick Kam Choo opinion is ambiguous).
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The defendants did not argue that the state court action should be en-
joined on the basis of claim preclusion on the theory that plaintiffs
could have raised, in the federal action, the issue of whether under
Texas law the Texas courts were an appropriate forum. Instead, the
defendants argued that the state court action should be enjoined be-
cause the question of whether Houston was a convenient forum had
already been decided by the federal court and a Texas state court
could not redetermine the issue.104 The court simply rejected that
argument.
Beyond this, Chick Kam Choo should not be read to limit a Federal
Court's capacity to issue an injunction in order to preserve its judge-
ments for another reason. "A dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds does not establish claim preclusion."10 5 At most, such a dis-
missal can work an issue preclusion.106 Chick Kam Choo involved pri-
marily a dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens. Thus, the
most plausible reading of Chick Kam Choo is that the court was setting
forth a requirement for enjoining state actions on the basis of issue
preclusion and not claim preclusion. In the context of issue preclu-
sion, Chick Kam Choo's language to the effect that actual litigation of
an issue is an essential prerequisite for the application of the relitiga-
tion exception makes perfect sense. It is, of course, well established
that an issue has no collateral estoppel effect if it has not been actually
litigated.107 For these reasons, Chick Kam Choo does not answer the
question whether federal courts can protect the full claim preclusion
effect of their judgments.
Nor does Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Locomotive Engi-
neers,1 08 the case upon which the Chick Kam Choo court relied, re-
quire a different conclusion. In Atlantic Coastline, a union picketed a
railroad. The railroad filed a complaint asserting three federal claims
and sought to enjoin the picketing. The district court refused the rail-
road's request and issued an order stating that the union was "free to
engage in self-help."10 9 The railroad then went to state court and ob-
tained an injunction against the picketing based on state law.110 The
union sought to enjoin the railroad's state court action. The federal
district court held that its determination was based on the union's fed-
104. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1887).
105. 18 WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 62 § 4436, at 346.
106. See id (dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds can work an issue preclusion
"if the issue actually remains the same").
107. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 14.11, at 671-72
(1985)("In addition, the person asserting estoppel must show that the issue to be
precluded actually was litigated and decided in the prior action and that it was
necessary to the court's judgment").
108. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
109. Id at 289.
110. Id. at 283.
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erally protected right to picket, and the railroad was precluded from
obtaining an injunction under state law.lll Thus, the federal district
court enjoined the state court proceeding to protect its judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court,
holding that the district court's order did not determine the issue of
whether federal law pre-empted an injunction based on state law.1' 2
The Court emphasized that the pre-emption issue had not actually
been presented or argued to the district court and the language of the
order did not clearly demonstrate that the issue had been decided.
Thus, the injunction was not necessary to protect the judgment.
Atlantic Coastline, however, does not answer the question of
whether a federal court can protect the full claim preclusion effect of
its judgment. As in Chick Kam Choo, the Court did not address the
question whether the state action should be enjoined on the ground
that the state law claims were barred by the doctrine of claim preclu-
sion. Thus, Atlantic Coastline does not answer the question whether
federal courts can enjoin claims that were not actually litigated but
which are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
In sum, neither Chick Kam Choo nor Atlantic Coastline, answer
the question whether federal courts can protect the full claim preclu-
sion effect of their judgments. We must look elsewhere in order to
properly interpret the Act.
c. The View of the Ninth Circuit
Only the Ninth Circuit has rejected the actual litigation test and
ruled that federal courts can protect the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments. In Western Systems, Inc., v. Ulloa,1l 3 Western Sys-
tems and the Ulloas filed suits against each other in a federal court in
Guam. The suits involved the validity of an agreement giving the Ul-
loas a right to ownership of stock in Western Systems. Western Sys-
tems won both lawsuits.1 4 Later, the Ulloas filed two additional suits
in Guam's territorial court, alleging claims which were closely related
to the original 1972 federal lawsuit, including a claim that the Ulloas
had the right to repurchase certain stock. Western Systems sought
and obtained a federal court injunction against the territorial court
proceedings.115
The question on appeal was whether the federal court could issue
an injunction to bar the claim to repurchase stock-a claim which had
not actually been litigated in federal court, but was barred by the doc-
111. Id at 284.
112. Id at 291-93.
113. 958 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992).
114. After substantial effort by Western Systems to collect on its judgment, the case
was settled in 1989.
115. Id at 866.
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trine of claim preclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunc-
tion.116 The court first noted that "[f]or years the prevailing rule in
the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere has been that [the Anti-Injunction
Act] does not prohibit injunctions against any claim that would be
barred by res judicata."117 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this
doctrine had been thrown into doubt by the Supreme Court's decision
in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. and those circuits that had con-
cluded that the relitigation exception was now limited to issues which
had actually been litigated by the federal court. Despite this, the court
rejected that narrow interpretation of the Act. The court observed
that the Chick Kam Choo Court had stated that the relitigation excep-
tion is "founded in the well recognized concepts of res judicata and
collateral estoppel."118 The court reasoned that to read Chick Kam
Choo as had other circuits "would in essence be to read res judicata
entirely out of [the Anti-Injunction Act]."119 The court understood
that "any claim which was 'actually litigated' by the parties in a prior
proceeding will be barred by collateral estoppel ('issue preclusion')
without any need to rely on res judicata ('claim preclusion')." 12 0 The
court rejected that result as contrary to the purposes of the Act. Thus,
the court held that the relitigation exception allowed the court to en-
join the Guam litigation on the ground that it was barred by res
judicata.121
The decision in Western Systems represents a significant advance
over the reasoning in the other circuits. Unlike the other circuits,
Western Systems does not rely uncritically on the troublesome lan-
guage in Chick Kam Choo which suggests that actual litigation is an
essential prerequisite for enjoining a claim under the Act. Instead, the
court analyzed the issue on the merits and correctly concluded that
federal suits have the power to protect the full claim preclusion effect
of their judgments. The court's decision, however, was not as well rea-
soned as it might have been. In particular, the court did not thor-
oughly consider the traditional methods of statutory construction and
did not consider the pre-Toucey law in reaching its conclusion.
III. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT
While the circuit courts are currently split concerning the question
of whether the federal courts have power to protect the full claim pre-
clusion effect of their judgments, this section attempts to resolve the
conflict. The better interpretation of the Anti-injuncion Act allows
116. 1&
117. Id. at 869.
118. Id. at 870 (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988)).
119. Id.
120. Id
121. Id at 871.
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federal courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judg-
ments by enjoining claims that have not actually been litigated as the
Ninth Circuit and the majority of courts prior to Chick Kam Choo rec-
ognized. This section goes beyond those decisions to provide a compre-
hensive rationale for that interpretation.
First, this section contends that Congress intended to reestablish
pre-Toucey understandings in the 1948 revision to the Act, and that
the pre-Toucey cases support the proposition that federal courts can
protect their judgments by enjoining claims that have not actually
been litigated. Second, this section explains that Congress, through its
silence and inaction, has ratified the view among the federal courts
prior to Chick Kam Choo that courts can protect the full claim preclu-
sion effect of their judgments. Finally, the section argues that it is
necessary to interpret the Act to allow protection of the full claim pre-
clusion effect of the judgment in order to accomplish other important
policies.
A. Congressional Intent: Restoring the Pre-Toucey Law
One of the shortcomings of Western Systems, Inc. v. Mloa122 and
the pre-Chick Kam Choo cases, is that they fail to thoroughly consider
and employ the standard methods of statutory construction in at-
tempting to answer the question of whether the Act allows federal
courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judgments.
The argument in this and the following sections seeks to remedy this
deficiency. In this regard, it is axiomatic that courts are to construe
legislation so as to effectuate legislative intent.123
As discussed in Part II.C. above, the available legislative material,
particularly, the Reviser's Note to the 1948 Revision of the Act, clearly
reveals the relevant legislative intent. The Reviser's Note states that
by enacting the relitigation exception, Congress intended to restore
pre-Toucey law regarding the power of the courts to protect and effec-
tuate their judgments. 124 Thus, to properly interpret the Act, we must
look to see how pre-Toucey cases resolved the issue of whether claims
had to be actually litigated in order to invoke the relitigation excep-
tion.12 5 The best interpretation of the pre-Toucey cases supports the
proposition that the federal courts can protect the full claim preclu-
122. 958 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)("Our objective in a case such as
this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will.")
Ray v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358, 361 (legislative intent
may be ascertained from the clear language of the statute itself or from available
legislative materials which clearly reveal this intent").
124. See supra note 37.
125. See T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1960) (examining
pre-Toucey case law in order to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act).
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sion effect of their judgments by enjoining claims that have not actu-
ally been litigated.
At the outset, the pre-Toucey cases show that it was well under-
stood that federal courts could issue injunctions to protect the claim
preclusion or res judicata effect of a judgment. For example, in
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,126 the plaintiff brought a class
action lawsuit against the Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur to enjoin what
was alleged to be an unlawful use of trust funds. The court entered a
final decree dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Subsequently, certain persons who were members of the original
class, but who had not been named plaintiffs in the earlier federal ac-
tion, filed suit in an Indiana state court against the Supreme Tribe and
sought to assert the same claims that were resolved in the earlier fed-
eral action. In response, the Supreme Tribe filed a bill in the federal
district court to enjoin the state court proceedings. The district court
refused to enjoin the state court action on the ground that "the decree
in (the federal class action) was and is not res adjudicata [sic] as to
(the state court plaintiffs)." 2 7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court could
enjoin the state court action inasmuch as the plaintiffs were ade-
quately represented in the class action and, therefore, "their rights
were concluded by original the decree."12 8 Because the federal judg-
ment was res judicata as to the state court plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court held that the state court proceedings could be enjoined to "pro-
tect the rights secured to all in the class by the decree rendered." 12 9
Supreme Tribe clearly supports the proposition that, before
Toucey, it was recognized that federal courts could enjoin state court
proceedings to protect the res judicata or claim preclusion effect of
their judgments.130 Supreme Tribe, however, involved claims that had
actually been litigated in the earlier federal proceeding. There are,
however, other pre-Toucey cases in which courts protected their de-
crees by enjoining claims that had not actually been litigated. Accord-
ingly, these cases support the proposition that a federal court can
126. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
127. Id. at 362.
128. Id. at 366.
129. Id. at 367.
130. See PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART & WECHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1322 (3d ed. 1988)(recognizing that Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), supported the view "that the federal courts had
authority to enjoin state relitigation of issues settled in a prior federal action");
Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State Court Proceedings, supra note 48, at 732
(After Supreme Tribe, "it was thought that despite the anti-injunction statute the
federal courts would enjoin state proceedings attempting to relitigate questions
already determined by a decision in federal court").
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protect the full claim preclusion effect of a judgment and enjoin
claims that have not actually been litigated.
For example, in United States v. Reading Co.,131 preferred stock-
holders filed a suit in federal court to enforce the dividend rates set
forth in a stockholder agreement. The common stockholders of the
company had denied the right of the preferred stockholders to partici-
pate equally in the profits of the company. The court held that the
stockholder agreement provided that the preferred stockholders were
entitled to "dividends at the rate of, but not exceeding, 4 percent per
annum, in each and every fiscal year." 32
Later, the preferred shareholders filed a suit in state court to ob-
tain additional stock dividends.133 In response, the common stock-
holders sought to enjoin the state court action. The district court
enjoined the state court action explaining that:
To our mind, this matter is res adjudicata as between the parties to the origi-
nal proceeding, and if allowed to proceed would involve a reexamination and
review by the state court of the decree of this court entered in pursuance of
the directions of the Supreme Court of the United States.1 3 4
Thus, the court protected the full claim preclusion effect of the judg-
ment by enjoining the preferred shareholders from litigating their
claims to additional rights to dividends-claims that had not actually
been litigated in the federal action.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Alexander.135 also is in-
structive. Wilson filed an action in federal court alleging that he was
entitled to foreclose on a deed to real estate securing certain bonds.136
Pursuant to stipulation by the parties, the court entered a final decree
which provided that Wilson owned the bonds and was entitled to fore-
close on the deed. In addition, the decree declared that the defendants
"and all persons claiming under them, be and they are hereby fore-
131. 300 F. 477 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
132. Id. at 478 (quoting from Continental Ins. Co. v. Prosser, 259 U.S. 156, 177 (1922)).
The court further held that:
if after providing for the payment of full dividends for any fiscal year on
the first preferred stock, there shall remain any surplus undivided net
profits, the board out of such surplus may declare and pay dividends for
such year, first to the second preferred stockholders, and thereafter to
the other stockholders of the company.
133. They sought a decree that, after the payment to all shareholders of the Reading
Company of 4 percent per annum dividends, the preferred stockholders should be
"entitled to share equally pro rata in any other or further dividends which may
be declared or paid on any stock of the company in and for each year .. " Id. at
479.
134. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
135. 276 F. 875 (5th Cir. 1921).
136. By written stipulation, the parties agreed that a final decree should be entered on
Wilson's claim "for all the relief therein prayed, the allegations of said [counter-
claim] being taken as true .. " Id at 877.
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closed of all right, title, claim and interest in or to the said real
estate."1 37
Later, Alexander filed suit against Wilson in Texas state court, al-
leging that the same bonds and deed were void under Texas law. Al-
exander also alleged that prior to the entry of the earlier federal
judgment he had entered into a side agreement with Wilson by which
Alexander held an equitable interest in the real estate and Wilson
held the property as a trustee for Alexander. Wilson filed a bill in
federal court to enjoin Alexander's state court suit. The district court
enjoined Alexander from prosecuting the state court suit.13 s
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.1 3 9 In so do-
ing, the court expressly rejected Alexander's argument that an injunc-
tion could not be issued because the claims that the bonds and deed
were void and that Wilson was holding the property as trustee for Al-
exander had not been litigated in the federal proceeding. The court
held that a decision by the state court in favor of Alexander would
change the effect of the federal decree, which was to declare that Wil-
son had absolute title to the real estate.140 Thus, the federal court
protected the full claim preclusion effect of its judgment by refusing
to allow Alexander to litigate his claims that the bonds and deed were
void and that there was a collateral agreement by which Alexander
held an equitable interest in the property-claims which could have
been but which were not actually litigated in the federal action.
So far, this article argues that in cases like Reading Co. and Wilson
the pre-Toucey courts protected the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments. Thus, the article rejects the proposition that pre-
Toucey courts applied the relitigation exception only to claims that
had actually been litigated. For an additional reason, Wilson supports
the proposition that before Toucey, it was understood that federal
courts had power to protect their decrees by issuing injunctions to bar
claims that had not been actually litigated. In that case, Wilson's
claims had not been actually litigated inasmuch as they had only been
137. Id.
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id- at 882.
140. The court stated: "If this [federal] decree was incorrect, and if at the time Alexan-
der had a right to redeem from foreclosure, and if Wilson was to hold only as
mortgagee in possession, it should have been so declared in the decree. Certainly,
it cannot be attempted in proceedings in another court to in graft a trust, claimed
to exist at the time, on the decree, which expressly debars Alexander, the party
claiming as the beneficiary, of all right, title interest, or claim." Id. at 881-82. The
court also rejected Alexander's argument that an injunction could not issue be-
cause Wilson could assert the defense of res judicata in the state court. The court
explained: "The right to plead the decree in federal court in defense to Alexan-
der's suit in the state court is no reason why a resort should not be had to the
equitable jurisdiction of the federal court." Id. at 881.
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resolved by stipulation.141 Nevertheless, the court had power to issue
an injunction to protect its decree even though the claims encom-
passed by that decree had not actually been litigated between the
parties.142
This article's contention is likewise supported by the pre-Toucey
141. See FRiEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 106, § 14.11 at 672 ("[I]t generally
is agreed that... stipulations made prior to trial should not be a basis for accord-
ing issues collateral estoppel treatment since in none of these situations were the
issues actually tried, that is, subject to an adversary presentation and consequent
judgment. By requiring that the issues be litigated, not stipulated or conceded,
the courts foster the ability of parties to agree on certain issues before trial with-
out concern that an agreement not to contest a particular issue will have an ad-
verse impact in ways not foreseen at the time. For these reasons, consent
judgments or judgments entered as a result of a settlement typically cannot be
used as the basis for issue preclusions"); Sekaquaptewa v. McDonald, 575 F.2d
239, 247 (9th Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 467
F.Supp. 885, 904-5 (N.D. Miss. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 614 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.
1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
142. As to the last point, to the same effect is the Supreme Court's decision in Prout v.
Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903). Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Nebraska federal court
against certain railroad companies in which plaintiffs held shareholder interests
and certain Nebraska state officials, including the attorney general of Nebraska.
The lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute which set max-
imum rates to be charged for the transportation of freights.
Subsequently, stockholders in several other railroad companies filed com-
plaints in the same federal district court against other railroad companies and the
same State of Nebraska officials that were defendants in the original case, in
which the "same facts and circumstances were alleged and the same relief was
prayed for as in the bill in the present case." Id- at 540. Those cases were tried
and final decrees were rendered against the defendants. ML The Supreme Court
affirmed those judgments. Id-
No testimony was ever taken in the first action. However, the parties had
entered into a stipulation while the other cases were pending "that the proofs
taken in them should be accepted with the same force and effect as if taken in
this case" and that "a decree should be entered conformable to those entered by
the Supreme Court in the other three cases." Id-
Subsequently, the attorney general of Nebraska brought a state court action
seeking to enforce the Act against the original defendant railroads. The original
plaintiffs then sought an injunction against the state court action. The federal
district court issued the injunction. Id- at 541.
The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction. I& at 544-45. The Supreme
Court viewed the stipulation as a federal decree, and enjoined the state suit in
order to protect that decree. The court explained, "The jurisdiction of the circuit
court could not be defeated or impaired by the institution by one of the parties, of
subsequent proceedings, whether civil or criminal, involving the same legal ques-
tions in the state court." Id- Thus, in Prout, the Supreme Court enjoined claims
that had been resolved by stipulation but not actually litigated.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit enjoined a claim that had been resolved by stipu-
lation but had not actually been litigated in Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Franz
51 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1931). In Mississippi Valley, Mississippi Valley Trust Coin-
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case of Gunter v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co.143 In Gunter, a fed-
eral court enjoined a state tax on the ground that it was unconstitu-
tional.144 Subsequently, the state brought an action in state court
seeking to collect the state tax that the federal court had previously
held was unconstitutional. The federal court enjoined the state court
action. 45
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction. 46 In so
pany was appointed administrator for the heirs of Franz. As such, Mississippi
Valley represented the heirs of Franz in extensive federal court litigation.
Subsequently, Franz filed an action in Missouri probate court alleging that the
appointment of Mississippi Valley had been null and void.
Mississippi Valley sought to enjoin Franz from prosecuting the state court ac-
tion. The district court granted the injunction. Id. at 1048. On review, the Eighth
Circuit noted (1) that Franz failed to raise a question of the validity of the ap-
pointment of Mississippi Valley as administrator in the federal litigation and (2)
that Franz had admitted the validity of the appointment in that litigation. The
court affirmed the injunction explaining that
It might throw some doubt upon the entire course and the results of this
litigation if any question could now be tolerated in the federal courts and
for the purposes of this litigation which could affect the standing of the
company as administrator... The sole interest of the federal court,
brought about by this litigation, is to protect is jurisdiction, action, and
decrees in this litigation.
Id. at 1049 (emphasis added). To protect its decree, the federal court enjoined
Franz from bringing a state court action that "in any way attack[ed] the validity
of the appointment of the company .. " despite the fact that the validity of the
appointment had not actually been litigated in federal court. Id. at 1048.
The Supreme Court's decision in Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93
(1904), is another example of a pre-Toucey case where the court enjoined claims
that had not actually been litigated. In Julian, a federal court in North Carolina
entered a decree foreclosing a second mortgage of the Western North Carolina
railroad company. Id. at 94. Under the decree, the property of the Western
North Carolina Railroad was to be sold to the Southern Railway Company free of
all claims of parties.
More than two years later, two women brought separate actions against the
Western North Carolina Railroad for the wrongful death of their husbands. In
neither of these suits was the Southern Railway named as a defendant. Both
plaintiffs won their lawsuits. Id. at 97. After winning these judgments, they
caused the sheriff to levy upon the property which had been conveyed by the
federal decree to Southern Railway in order to satisfy the judgments rendered in
the state courts. As a result, the Southern Railway Company sought to enjoin the
state court proceedings. The lower court granted the injunction. Id. at 100.
The United State Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against the state
court proceedings in order to protect "the prior jurisdiction of the Federal court
and to render effectual its decree." Id. at 112.
In Julian, the Supreme Court recognized that federal courts can protect judg-
ments by issuing an injunction against claims that had not actually been litigated.
Plaintiffs' claims had not been litigated in the federal proceeding. Yet those
claims could be enjoined to protect the earlier federal decree.
143. 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
144. Id. at 278.
145. Id. at 282.
146. Id. at 291-93.
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doing, the Court expressly rejected the state's argument that an in-
junction could not issue because the defendants in the state action
could simply plead res judicata.147 The Court reasoned that "[h]aving
acquired by [the earlier federal] decree a right which the [defendant]
was entitled to enforce" the court had "the power to protect the [de-
fendant] in the enjoyment of rights previously secured under a decree
of the court."1 48
This case supports the proposition that a federal court can protect
the full claim preclusion effect of judgment. Absent such power a
party would be forced to rely on res judicata as a defense in state court
in those cases where a party seeks to enjoin claims that are barred by
claim preclusion but have not been litigated. Since Gunter rejected
the idea that a party should be forced to rely on res judicata as a de-
fense, the best interpretation of the pre-Toucey cases is that they
would allow a court to protect the full claim preclusion effect of its
decrees-whether or not a claim had actually been litigated.
The reasoning of Dietzsch v. Huidekoper,49 also is relevant.
Although Dietzsch may be read as authorizing an injunction based on
the statutory exception dealing with the removal of actions, the case
has also been persuasively interpreted as one of the cases establishing
the relitigation exception.15 0 Given this, the rationale of Dietzsch is
important to consider. In Dietzsch, the plaintiff brought an action in
replevin in an Illinois state court. Later, the defendant's removed the
case to an Illinois federal court. After losing in the federal court, the
plaintiffs brought a state court action on a replevin bond. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's injunction against the state
court suit explaining that:
A court of the United States is not prevented from enforcing its own judg-
ments by the statute which forbids it to grant a writ of injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a state court .... [If the court lacked such power, defendants]
would find themselves in precisely the same plight as if the judgment of the
United States Circuit Court in the replevin suit had been against them, in-
stead of for them. The judgment in their favor would settle nothing. Instead
of terminating the strife between them and their adversaries, it would leave
them under the necessity of engaging in a new conflict elsewhere. This would
be contrary to the plainest principles of reason and justice.1 5 1
The rationale of Dietzsch supports the use of injunctions against
claims which are barred by claim preclusion but have not actually
been litigated. As in Dietzsch, if a federal court is without such power,
the judgment in a party's favor would settle nothing. A federal court
could not prevent an unhappy plaintiff from attempting to litigate
147. Id. at 293.
148. Id at 293.
149. 103 U.S. 494 (1880).
150. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 148 (1941).
151. Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494, 497 (1880).
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claims in state court that were barred by the doctrine of claim preclu-
sion, but which had not actually been decided. Instead of terminating
litigation, the judgment would leave such party under the necessity of
engaging in a new litigation elsewhere.
For all these reasons, the pre-Toucey cases support the proposition
that federal courts have the power to protect the full claim preclusion
effect of their judgments.52
B. Ascertaining Congressional Intent: The Significance of Congressional
Silence and Inaction
There are other important reasons to suppose that Congress in-
tended that federal courts could protect the full claim preclusion ef-
fect of their judgments. For one reason, Congress has ratified this
interpretation of the Act through its silence. There are two separate
arguments to support this point. First, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that where over a number of years federal courts have taken an
almost uniform view in interpreting an Act of Congress, Congress'
failure to change that view with new legislation amounts to congres-
sional approval of that interpretation. 153 The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Evans v. United States,154 is instructive on this point. In
Evans, the issue was the proper interpretation of the Hobbs Act. The
court observed that for over twenty years, the lower federal courts
had taken an almost uniform view when interpreting the Hobbs Act.
Accordingly, Congress was or should have been aware of the prevail-
ing view of the Act.155 The Supreme Court concluded that Congress'
failure to alter that view with additional legislation meant that Con-
gress has ratified that view with its silence.15 6
Similarly, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,157 the Supreme Court re-
lied on Congressional silence and inaction in interpreting the National
Labor Relations Act. At issue was whether Congress intended "mana-
gerial employees" to be excluded from the protections of the Act. The
court observed that following the passage of the Act, the National La-
152. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (1985)(arguing that a propo-
sition of law is sound if it provides the best justification of available legal
materials).
153. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1403 (1988)(observing that the Supreme Court has developed the following ap-
proach to statutory interpretation: "if Congress is aware of the Court's prior stat-
utory interpretation and does not change it, the Court should presume that
Congress has 'acquiesced' in the interpretation"). Professor Eskridge notes that
this approach "has proved to be particularly robust in the 1970s and 1980s." Id. at
1367.
154. 112 S.Ct. 1881 (1992).
155. See id. at 1889-90.
156. Id.
157. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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bor Relations Board and the lower federal courts for more than two
decades had consistently construed the Act to exclude "managerial
employees" from coverage under the Act. In holding that Congress
intended that "managerial employees" would not be covered by the
Act, the court accorded "great weight to the longstanding interpreta-
tion placed on [the Act] by [the National Labor Relations Board]."-58
The court explained: "[ifn these circumstances, congressional failure
to revise or repeal [this] interpretation is persuasive evidence that the
interpretation is the one intended by Congress."1 5 9
The principle of statutory interpretation established by Evans and
NLRB is applicable to whether federal courts can protect the full
claim preclusion effect of their judgments. For three decades the fed-
eral courts have almost uniformly interpreted the 1948 revision to the
Act to allow federal courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments.16 0 Congress is or should have been aware of this pre-
vailing view.161 Given this, Congress ratified this interpretation of the
Act through its silence.
So far, the argument based on Congressional silence and inaction
has focused on Congress' failure to revise or repeal the interpretation
placed on the Act by the federal courts following the 1948 Revision to
the Act as persuasive evidence of Congress' intent. Another argument
based on Congressional silence and inaction can be made to support
the proposition that Congress intended that federal courts could pro-
tect the full claim preclusion effect of their judgments. The argument
is based on the congressional reenactment theoryl62 and emphasizes
the legal context in which Congress revised the Anti-Injunction Act in
1948.
The Supreme Court explained the congressional re-enactment the-
ory in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran.16 3 In Cur-
ran, the Court ruled that Congress intended to allow a private right of
action under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). In interpreting
the Act, the court explained that the "focus must be on the state of the
law at the time the legislation was enacted."164 The court reasoned:
158. Id at 275.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 40-64.
161. See Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15
(1985)("Congress is presumed to be aware of... [a] judicial interpretation of a
statute .. ")
162. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557, 560-71 (1982)(discussing
congressional reenactment theory); MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURI-
TIES LAW § 8.02, at 159-60 (1989)(discussing congressional reenactment theory in
the context of securities law).
163. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
164. Id. at 378.
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[w]e must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or re-
shaping. When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Con-
gress intended to create a private remedy as a supplement to the express
enforcement provisions of the statute. When Congress acts in a statutory con-
text in which an implied private remedy has already been recognized by the
courts, however, the inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have in-
tended to create a new remedy, since one already existed; the question is
whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.1 6 5
Thus, the Court inquired into the contemporary legal context in
which Congress legislated when it revised the CEA in 1974. The Court
explained that in the years prior to the 1974 revision of the CEA, the
lower federal courts "routinely and consistently" recognized an im-
plied private cause of action under the CEA.166 Given this, the Court
concluded that "an implied cause of action under the CEA was a part
of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress legislated in
1974.167 In that context, the fact that Congress did not amend the Act
so as to eliminate a private cause of action when it revised the CEA in
1974 was evidence that Congress intended to preserve that remedy.168
The Supreme Court also employed the congressional re-enactment
theory in Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management.169 At issue was
whether Congress intended that there should be judicial review of dis-
ability retirement decisions made by the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment under the Civil Service Retirement Act. Prior to the
amendment of the Act in 1980, courts had interpreted the Act to allow
for judicial review. The Court presumed that Congress was aware of
this interpretation at the time it amended the Act in 1980.170 The
Court held that "the fact that Congress amended [the Act] in 1980
without explicitly repealing the established [interpretation] itself
gives rise to a presumption that Congress intended to embody [that
interpretation] in the amended version of [the Act]."171
Given all this, it is appropriate to consider the legal context at the
165. Id. at 378-79.
166. The Supreme Court observed that "it is always appropriate to assume that our
elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." Id. at 379 (quoting
Canon v. University of Chicago, 44 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979)).
167. Id. at 381-82.
168. Id. at 381-382. The Supreme Court also applied the congressional reenactment
theory in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). The Court ob-
served that "when Congress comprehensively revised the securities laws in 1975,
a consistent line of judicial decision had permitted plaintiffs to sue under Section
10(b) regardless of the availability of express remedies." Id. at 384. Given this
"well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave Section 10(b)
intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the Section 10(b)
action." Id. at 386.
169. 470 U.S. 768 (1985).
170. Id. at 782.
171. Id. See also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:14, at 64
(1979)(statutory reenactment without change has been held to imply congres-
sional approval of interpretation of statutes).
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time the Anti-Injunction Act was revised in 1948. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court eliminated the relitigation exception in 1941 in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.172 The Reviser's Note to the 1948
revision states that Congress intended the 1948 revision to restore the
pre-Toucey law regarding the power of the federal courts to protect
judgments. 73 Thus, Congress enacted the 1948 Revision of the Act
against the background of pre-Toucey law. As demonstrated above,
the pre-Toucey courts interpreted the Act to allow federal courts to
protect the full claim preclusion effect.of their judgments. Congress is
presumed to have been aware of this judicial interpretation. Since
Congress did not expressly repeal this interpretation of the Act when
it revised the Act in 1948, Congress is presumed to have preserved the
interpretation that federal courts can protect the full claim preclusion
effect of their judgments.
C. Carrying Out the Purposes of the Act
To interpret the Act properly, the policies behind the Act also
must be considered. The Supreme Court has directed federal courts to
not "construe statutory phrases in isolation."174 Courts are to consider
"the design of the statute as a whole and.., its object and policy."'175
In Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,176 the Supreme Court stated that
the relitigation exception "is founded in the well-recognized concepts
of res judicata and collateral estoppel." The Chick Kam Choo Court
also recognized that the exceptions to the Act "are designed to ensure
[sic] the effectiveness and supremacy of federal law."'177 Thus, the
purposes of the relitigation exception are to promote the policies be-
hind res judicata, including ending litigation, upholding the integrity
and stability of federal judgments and insuring the effectiveness and
supremacy of the federal res judicata law.1 7 8
In Federated Department Stores v. Moitie,179 the Supreme Court
172. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
173. See supra note 37.
174. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984).
175. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). See also Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)("As in all cases of statutory con-
struction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the pur-
poses Congress sought to serve.").
176. 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
177. Id at 146.
178. See Chrysler Corp. v. E.L. Jones Dodge, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 969, 972 (W.D. Pa.
1976) ("Informed public policies require that the judgment of this court and fed-
eral actions be accorded stability and certainty, and these same policies underlie
[the relitigation exception .... ]"); Hayward v. Clay, 456 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (D.S.C.
1977)("the principles embodied in [the relitigation exception]" are "designed to
uphold the integrity of federal court judgments and effectuate the policy of end-
ing litigation").
179. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
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recently discussed the important policies promoted by the doctrine of
res judicata. The Court explained that the "doctrine of res judicata
serves vital public interests."s 0 In the Court's view, "[p]ublic policy
dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have con-
tested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that
matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the
parties."1 81 The Court stressed that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is
not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more
technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial
justice, 'of public policy and of private peace,' which should be cordi-
ally regarded and enforced by the courts."18 2
Given this, courts should interpret the Act so as to carry out the
highly significant federal policies served by the doctrine of res judicata
and insure the effectiveness of federal res judicata law. Clearly, inter-
preting the Act so as to allow courts to protect only some of the claim
preclusion effect of their judgments would not promote the policies of
res judicata or guarantee the effectiveness and supremacy of the fed-
eral res judicata law as well as an interpretation that allows a federal
court to protect the full claim preclusion effect of its judgment. Only
with such power can the court bring litigation to an end and insure the
integrity of federal judgments. Without such power, a federal court
would be helpless to prevent a disgruntled plaintiff from attempting
to litigate claims in state court that were barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion, but which had not actually been litigated.18 3 As the
Supreme Court explained over one hundred years ago in Dietzsch v.
Huidekoper,184 this situation would mean that the judgment in a
party's favor "would settle nothing." 8 5 A federal judgment would
represent only "cause for alarm that the battle was to be fought over
again."86 Moreover, only with such power can the federal courts
carry out the Supreme Court's direction in Moitie that the doctrine of
res judicata should be "cordially regarded and enforced." 18 7 Thus, the
purposes of the relitigation exception are best served by interpreting
the Act so as to allow courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect
180. Id. at 401.
181. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)).
182. Id. (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).
183. See Allan D. Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judgment, 42 TENN. L. REV. 635,
647 (1975)("It is not unusual to find in state court an attempt to relitigate a claim
already considered on the merits in federal court. Just as a losing party in a state
court may attempt to try his case a second time in federal court, the reverse is
true; unhappy with the result in federal court, the litigant may seek a second 'bite
of the apple' in a state forum").
184. 103 U.S. 494 (1881).
185. Id. at 497.
186. Chrysler Corp. v. E.L. Jones Dodge, 421 F.Supp. 969, 972 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
187. 425 U.S. 394, 394 (1981)(quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S.
294, 299 (1917)).
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of their judgments. 8 8
In response, one might offer the following two objections. First,
one might contend that state courts could be relied on to enforce the
claim preclusion effect of a judgement which would promote the poli-
cies of res judicata and insure the supremacy of federal res judicata
law.18 9 This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. It is highly un-
likely that the state courts could promote the policies of res judicata as
effectively as the federal court which originally rendered the judg-
ment. Courts have recognized that the judge rendering the original
judgment-here, the federal judge-is in the best position to assess
whether the state court claims are barred by res judicata.19 0 As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained, that judge "knows best what he did
and did not decide."191
Given this familiarity with the record, a federal district court
judge-as opposed to a state court judge-is more likely to accurately
determine whether a claim is barred by res judicata. Thus, to best
effectuate the policies behind the doctrine of res judicata and insure
the effectiveness and supremacy of the federal res judicata law, courts
should interpret the Act to allow a federal court to protect the full
claim preclusion effect of its judgment.
Beyond this, there is an even more important reason why courts
should not adopt an interpretation of the Act which forces federal
courts to rely on state courts to enforce the claim preclusion effect of
their judgments. Forced reliance on state courts to determine the res
judicata effects of federal judgments is contrary to the important fed-
eral policy that federal courts should be able to determine the scope of
their own judgments. This argument finds support in the reasoning of
cases that have concluded that federal res judicata rules should govern
the preclusive effect of judgments on state law claims rendered by the
federal courts in diversity cases. For example, in Kern v. Hettinger,92
the question for decision was whether the preclusive effect of a diver-
188. Cf. Graven v. Fink, 936 F.2d 378, 385 (8th Cir. 1991)(interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code so as to promote its "broad purpose").
189. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 585-86 (11th Cir.
1983)("A state court is as well qualified as a federal court to protect a litigant by
the doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel.")(quoting Southern Cali-
fornia Petroleum Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir. 1960).
190. See, e.g., Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster, 796 F.2d 252, 253 n.2 (9th Cir.
1986) ("Judge Orrick was in the best position to assess the strength of this relitiga-
tion allegation as he was the same judge who presided over the Federal FLSA
enforcement proceeding which is the alleged basis for res judicata preclusion.");
Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715, 719 (5th Cir.
1960)("The trial judge was the same trial judge who sat on Harper's 1955 suit. He
was peculiarly qualified to compare the issues, determine the question of relitiga-
tion, and decide the propriety of an injunction.").
191. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1983).
192. 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
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sity judgment should be governed by federal law or California law. In
holding that the preclusive effect of the diversity judgment was to be
governed by federal law, the court reasoned:
[O]ne of the strongest policies a court can have is that of determining the
scope of its own judgments. It would be destructive of the basic principles of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to say that the effect of a judgment of a
federal court was governed by the law of the state where the court sits simply
because the source of Federal jurisdiction is diversity. The rights and obliga-
tions of the parties are fixed by state law.... But we think it would be strange
doctrine to allow a state to nullify the judgments of federal courts .... 193
In an influential article, Professor Degnan has explained why it is
essential that federal courts have the power to determine the scope of
their own judgments.194 The importance of this power is rooted in
Article III of the United States Constitution-the constitutional provi-
sion which describes the federal judicial power.195 "[T]he power to
decide the force of federal adjudications is ... a defining element of
Article III judicial power."196 Thus, without the power to determine
the scope of its own judgments, a federal court "is less than a
court."19 7
This reasoning is applicable to the question of whether federal
courts have the power to protect the full claim preclusion effect of
their judgments. Absent such power, a federal court would lack the
power to determine the force and binding effect of its judgments. This
would mean that the federal court would not possess full federal judi-
cial power because "it is in the nature of the judicial power to deter-
mine its own boundaries." 98 Without the power to determine the
scope of its own judgments, the federal court "is less than a court."199
Thus, the Act should be construed to allow a federal court to protect
the full claim preclusion effect of its judgments so as to not deprive
the courts of the power to determine the scope of their own
judgments.
Second, one might argue that one of the key policies behind res
judicata-promoting the integrity of federal court judgments-would
not be undermined if federal courts had no power to protect the full
claim preclusion effect of their judgments. In Delta Airlines, Inc. v.
McCoy Restaurants, Inc.,200 the Eleventh Circuit suggested such an ar-
gument when it observed that "a federal court's judgment is presuma-
bly far more threatened if the state proceeding involves the same
193. Id. at 340 (citation omitted).
194. See Ronald E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
195. Id. at 768.
196. Id, at 770 n.138.
197. Id. at 769.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 708 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1983).
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issues than if it involves only issues that could have been, but were
not, raised."201 In Delta Airlines, the court refused to protect the full
claim preclusion effect of judgment reasoning that the state court pro-
ceeding would not "undermine the integrity of the federal court rul-
ing" since the state law claims had not actually been decided in the
federal proceeding.20 2
This argument should be rejected. A federal court judgment is un-
dermined if a state court is permitted to nullify the claim preclusion
effect of the judgment. "[A] federal judgment is regarded as a reposi-
tory of federal substantive rights."203 One of the rights contained in a
federal judgment is the right granted "by operation of res judicata to
be protected from harassing multiple suits on the same claim."2 04
"[R]es Judicata creates substantive rights in both litigants by allowing
the plaintiff his one day in court, and the defendant the assurance of
protection from multiple suits." 2 0 5 Thus, if a state court allows a claim
to proceed that should have been barred by res judicata, that lawsuit
undermines the integrity of the federal judgment by nullifying the res
judicata rights that were established by it.
D. The Protection of Federal Rights
In interpreting the Act, it seems fair to consider whether the inter-
pretation would displace the federal courts from their traditional role
as the protectors of the people's federal rights. In 1875, Congress en-
acted a statute which provided the lower federal courts with general
federal question jurisdiction over civil suits based on the Constitution
and laws of the United States. 2 06 Following this enactment, the
Supreme Court stated in Steffel v. Thompson 20 7 that "the lower fed-
eral courts... became the primary and powerful reliances for vindi-
cating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of
the United States."208 Similarly, in Mitchum v Foster,20 9 the Supreme
Court recognized that the federal courts were to be the "guardians of
the people's federal rights."210 This view is based in part on the notion
201. Id. at 586.
202. Id.
203. Stephen B. Burbank, Intejurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 771 (1986);
Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 520 (1903)(recognizing that federal judg-
ments are repositories of federal rights).
204. Mark G. Emerson, Note, Res Judicata in the Federal Courts: Federal or State
Law?, 17 IND. L. REv. 523, 539 (1984)(Footnote omitted).
205. Id.
206. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
207. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
208. Id. at 464 (quoting FRANKFURTER & LANDIs, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREME
COURT 65 (1926)(emphasis in original)).
209. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
210. Id. at 242. See also England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375
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that state courts are not as fair or competent as federal courts in the
adjudication of federal rights.211 These considerations are significant.
The res judicata effect of federal judgments is a matter of federal
law.212 Thus, a party's right to the claim preclusion effect of a judg-
ment is a federal right.2 1 3 Accordingly, if the federal courts are to be
the primary guardians of our federal rights, the Act should be inter-
preted to allow the federal courts to issue injunctions to protect the
full claim preclusion effect of the judgments. Otherwise, state courts
will be the primary decision makers regarding a party's federal right
to claim preclusion. 214
One might contend in response that the failure of a state court to
protect the full claim preclusion effect of a judgment would present a
federal question, which could be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to a writ of certiorari.2 15 Given this availa-
U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (recognizing "the primacy of the federal judiciary in decid-
ing questions of federal law"); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 828
(1965)(Following the Civil War, "[t]he assumption was abandoned that the state
courts were the normal place for enforcement of federal law save in rare and
narrow instances where they affirmatively demonstrated themselves unfit or un-
fair. Now the federal courts were seen as the needed organs, the ordinary and
natural agencies, for the administration of federal rights.").
211. See CHEMERISKY, supra note 17, § 1.5, at 29-30 (Those favoring federal court avail-
ability to adjudicate federal claims "argue that state courts are not to be trusted
to adequately safeguard federal rights"); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1124-27 (1977). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which
held that fourth amendment search and seizure claims could not be relitigated in
federal habeas corpus proceedings, the Court appeared to reject arguments that
questioned the fairness and competency of the state courts in adjudicating federal
rights. See id. at 493-94 n.35. However, the Court's reasoning in Stone on this
point has been severely criticized. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 15.5, at 715.
For example, Gary Peller has argued that the Stone Court's assumption of parity
between the state and federal courts is unjustified. See Gary Peller, In Defense of
Federal Habeas Corpus Litigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 663-69 (1982).
Peller notes that even the Stone Court conceded that "state courts have often
been insensitive to various" federal rights, and the "Court presented no evidence
that such insensitivity had been erased." Id. at 667. See also Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977)("[T]he assumption of parity is
... a dangerous myth, fostering forum allocation decisions which channel consti-
tutional adjudication under the illusion that state courts will vindicate federally
secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower federal courts.")
212. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130, 134 (1874); Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838
F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988).
213. See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130, 134 (1874).
214. Cf. REDISH, supra note 18, at 313 (suggesting that the relitigation exception may
reflect mistrust of the state courts' ability to accord proper respect to federal
judgments).
215. See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130, 134 (1874)("where a state court refuses
to give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States rendered upon the
point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is
[Vol. 72:643
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bility of Supreme Court review, arguably, the federal courts would re-
main the primary decision makers regarding a party's res judicata
rights.
This argument cannot withstand analysis. The availability of
Supreme Court review is simply not a satisfactory method of protect-
ing federal judgments. Because an appeal of right no longer exists
from a state court's failure to give res judicata effect to a federal deci-
sion, and since the Supreme Court's decisions to grant writs of certio-
rari are based more upon considerations of general public interest
than of the interests of the individual litigants, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court would decide to review a state court's refusal to give
res judicata effect to a federal judgment.21 6 Thus, the availability of
Supreme Court review would not insure that federal courts will be the
primary decision makers regarding a party's federal res judicata
rights.217
E. The Protection of Consent Decrees
This article argues that federal courts can protect the full claim
preclusion effects of their judgments. Thus, it rejects the proposition
that the relitigation exception applies only to claims that have been
actually litigated. An additional reason for accepting the proposed in-
terpretation of the Act, is that it is the only interpretation consistent
with allowing federal courts to protect their consent decrees under the
undoubtedly raised which... may be brought to this court for revision. The case
would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against the title or right so set up. It
would thus be a case arising under the laws of the United States, establishing the
Circuit Court and vesting it with jurisdiction; and hence it would be within the
judicial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it is
clearly within the chart of the appellate power given to this Court, over cases
arising in and decided by the state courts."); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118, 129 n.1 (1941)("Pleading a federal decree as res judicata raises ... a
federal question reviewable in this Court .... ).
216. See Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARv. L. REV. 726,
734 (1961); Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 392-
93 (1923)("[1]t is very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of
certiorari except in cases involving principles the settlement of which is of impor-
tance to the public as distinguished from that of the parties .... ); WRIGHT, ET AL.
supra note 62, § 4004, at 507-08 ("As the number of cases seeking review has
grown, the [Supreme Court] docket has had to be devoted more and more to con-
stitutional and statutory questions that are likely to have widespread general
impact.").
217. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16
(1964) (recognizing that the possibility of Supreme Court review of a state court
decision on a federal claim would not insure "the primacy of the federal judiciary
in deciding questions of federal law" because it was uncertain that the Supreme
Court would actually review the federal claim).
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relitigation exception.21 8
Many federal courts have considered whether they can enjoin state
court actions to protect their consent decrees. Several courts have in-
voked the relitigation exception to protect such decrees.2 1 9 Only the
Seventh Circuit has rejected this view, holding that such judgments do
not have the same effect "as do fully litigated judgments."2 20 If the
relitigation exception applies only to claims that have been actually
litigated, then federal courts will not be able to protect consent de-
crees since those decrees are resolved by settlement and do not in-
volve actually litigated claims.221 Courts should not adopt an
interpretation of the Act which allows such a result. As one commen-
tator has explained, "when a complex, negotiated decree that termi-
nates federal court litigation can be undercut or frustrated by
competing state court litigation (often brought by unnamed class rep-
resentatives or others affected by the first case) it seems reasonable to
read the Act to permit protective injunctions."222
In addition, an interpretation of the Act that would allow federal
courts to protect consent decrees is supported by the pre-Toucey case
law. As discussed in Section III.A. above, the pre-Toucey courts en-
joined state court proceedings in order to protect federal decrees that
had been entered pursuant to stipulation or agreement by the parties.
Thus, to insure that federal courts have the power to protect consent
decrees we should reject the proposition that the Act applies only to
claims that have actually been litigated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most courts have read the Supreme Court's decision in Chick Kam
Choo v. Exxon Corp.223 to mean that the relitigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act does not permit the federal courts to enjoin state
court proceedings to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their
judgments. That interpretation of Chick Kam Choo is mistaken. In
addition, that interpretation of the Act should be rejected because it is
contrary to Congressional intent and threatens to undermine the fed-
eral judicial power. The interpretation risks displacing the federal
218. See Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985)("To ascertain
... legislative intent, we may properly consider... the consequences of various
interpretations.").
219. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1989); Brooks
v. Barbour Energy Corp., 804 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. District
of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. ASCAP, 442 F.2d 601
(2d Cir. 1971).
220. Dunn v. Carey., 808 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1986).
221. See supra note 145.
222. Diane P. Wood, Fine Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the
Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 307 (1990).
223. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
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courts from their traditional role as the primary protectors of federal
rights. It also threatens to undermine the integrity of federal judg-
ments and the policies animating the federal law of res judicata.
In response to this situation, the foregoing analysis has sought to
establish that the Anti-Injunction Act should be construed to allow
federal courts to protect the full claim preclusion effect of their judg-
ments. Interpreting the Act in such a manner, will effectuate Con-
gressional intent and preserve the power of the federal courts. The
proposed interpretation will also promote the policies behind the fed-
eral law of res juicata.
